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      Issue 
Has Stover failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order 
denying his untimely and successive Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence? 
 
 
Stover Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Of The District Court’s Order 
Denying His Untimely, Successive Rule 35 Motion 
 
 In 2003, a jury found Stover guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a child 
under 16 and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 30 years, with 
10 years fixed.  (30313 R., pp.65-69.)  Stover filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction 
of sentence on February 12, 2004, which the district court subsequently denied.  (43707 
2 
 
R., pp.7-8, 15-17.)  More than 11 years later, on August 26, 2015, Stover filed a second 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied as 
successive and untimely.  (43707 R., pp.30-32, 47-48.)  Stover filed a notice of appeal 
timely only from the district court’s order denying Stover’s second Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence.  (43707 R., pp.49-52.)   
Stover asserts that the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence because, he claims, he was sexually assaulted in prison, “causing 
[his] sentence to become cruel and unusual punishment.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-3.)  
Stover has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 vests the district court with jurisdiction to consider and act 
upon a motion to reduce a sentence that is “filed within 120 days of the entry of the 
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction.”  I.C.R. 35.  The 
120-day filing limit is a jurisdictional restraint on the power of the court which deprives 
the court of the authority to entertain an untimely motion.  State v. Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 
552, 835 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hocker, 119 Idaho 105, 106, 803 
P.2d 1011, 1012 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Parrish, 110 Idaho 599, 600, 716 P.2d 1371, 
1372 (Ct. App. 1986).  Idaho Criminal Rule 35 also provides that “no defendant may file 
more than one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.”  In State v. 
Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that “a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an improper successive 
motion and is prohibited by Rule 35.  We hold that the prohibition of successive motions 
under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit.”   
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Stover filed his first Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on February 12, 
2004.  (43707 R., pp.7-8.)  The district court denied the motion on March 4, 2004.  
(43707 R., pp.15-17.)  More than 11 years later, on August 26, 2015, Stover filed a 
second, successive Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence requesting that the 
district court reduce his sentence “so that [he] may receive mental health and medical 
care, in an environment so that [he] may feel safe from repercussions.”  (43707 R., 
pp.30-32.)  On October 9, 2015, the district court entered an order denying Stover’s 
motion, correctly finding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief on the Rule 35 motion 
for sentence reduction because the motion was both successive and untimely.  (43707 
R., pp.47-48.)  Because Stover’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence was filed 
over 11 years after the entry of judgment, and because the motion was an improper, 
successive Rule 35 motion, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.  The 
court’s order denying Stover’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence must 
therefore be affirmed.   
To the extent that Stover is now claiming, for the first time on appeal, that his 
sentence is illegal because his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence “had valid 
issues that caused [his] sentence to become illegal” (Appellant’s brief, p.1), this issue 
was not preserved below, and therefore is improperly raised on appeal.  Stover failed to 
request correction of an illegal sentence from the district court, but instead requested a 
reduction of sentence “so that [he] may receive mental health and medical care, in an 
environment so that [he] may feel safe from repercussions.”  (43707 R., p.31.)  Stover 
may yet file a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence in the district court.  
However, because Stover failed to raise the issue of an illegal sentence in the district 
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court, he has failed to show that the issue is preserved and he is not entitled to 
appellate relief in relation to his illegal sentence claim.  
Failure to raise an issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court the 
opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal.  
State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 
Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 
P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997).  “Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 
45 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125, 
129 (1995)); accord State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 307 P.3d 187 (2013).  While an 
exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error, the burden 
of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant asserting the error 
for the first time on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 228, 245 P.3d at 976, 980.  To 
carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must 
demonstrate that the error he alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information 
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980, quoted in Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190.   
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows that Stover 
waived appellate consideration of his claim that the trial court erred “in denying the Rule 
35 motion, which had valid issues that caused [his] sentence to become illegal.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.1.)  As stated above, Stover did not file a Rule 35 motion for 
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correction of an illegal sentence and did not otherwise ask the sentencing court to 
correct an illegal sentence.  Nor has he argued on appeal that the district court’s failure 
to correct an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error under the standards 
articulated in Perry, supra.  (See generally, Appellant’s brief, pp.1-3.)  Even if he had, 
the claim would fail under the first prong of Perry, which requires Stover to demonstrate 
a violation of one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 
245 P.3d at 980.  Because the “right” to correction of an illegal sentence reduction 
stems from a rule of criminal procedure – I.C.R. 35 – and not from any constitutional 
provision, Stover’s claim of error fails to satisfy even the threshold requirement for 
review under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 
P.3d 529, 534 (Ct. App. 2014); compare Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 
(because claim that sentencing court erred by not sua sponte ordering psychological 
evaluation in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522 asserted a statutory violation, not a 
violation of a constitutional right, the claim was not reviewable as fundamental error).  
Furthermore, even if Stover’s claim satisfied the first prong of Perry, the claim would fail 
under the second prong of Perry, which requires Stover to demonstrate that the error he 
alleges plainly exists without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  There is no evidence 
contained in the record that supports Stover’s claim that his sentence is illegal.   
Because the issue was not raised below, and because Stover has not even 
asserted fundamental error, much less carried his burden of establishing it, this Court 
must decline to consider the merits of Stover’s claim that the trial court erred by denying 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Stover’s untimely, successive Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
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